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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN A NETWORKED WORLD 
Jonathan Zittrain* 
Replying to Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 531 (2005). 
 
Professor Kerr has published a thorough and careful article on the 
application of the Fourth Amendment to searches of computers in pri-
vate hands — a treatment that has previously escaped the attentions of 
legal academia.1  Such a treatment is perhaps so overdue that it has 
been overtaken by two phenomena: first, the emergence of an overrid-
ing concern within the United States about terrorism; and second, 
changes in the way people engage in and store their most private digi-
tal communications and artifacts. 
The first phenomenon has foregrounded a challenge by the execu-
tive to the very notion that certain kinds of searches and seizures may 
be proscribed or regulated by Congress or the judiciary.  The second 
phenomenon, grounded in the mass public availability of always-on 
Internet broadband, is leading to the routine entrustment of most pri-
vate data to the custody of third parties — something orthogonal to a 
doctrinal framework in which the custodian of matter searched, rather 
than the person who is the real target of interest of a search, is typi-
cally the only one capable of meaningfully asserting Fourth Amend-
ment rights to prevent a search or the use of its fruits. 
Together, these phenomena make the application of the Fourth 
Amendment to the “standard” searches of home computers — 
searches that, to be sure, are still conducted regularly by national and 
local law enforcement — an interesting exercise that is yet overshad-
owed by greatly increased government hunger for private information 
of all sorts, both individual and aggregate, and by rapid developments 
in networked technology that will be used to satisfy that hunger.  Per-
haps most important, these factors transform Professor Kerr’s view 
that a search occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes only when its re-
sults are exposed to human eyes: such a notion goes from unremarka-
bly unobjectionable — police are permitted to mirror entirely a sus-
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pect’s hard drive and then are constitutionally limited as they perform 
searches on the copy — to dangerous to any notion of limited govern-
ment powers.  Professor Kerr appreciates this as a “troublesome” 
result — indeed, “downright creepy” — but does not dwell upon 
it beyond suggesting that the copying of data might be viewed as 
a seizure if not a search, at least so long as it involves some 
physical touching or temporary “commandeering” of the ma-
chine.2  This view should be amplified: If remote “vacuum cleaner” 
approaches are used to record and store potentially all Internet and 
telephone communications for later searching, with no Fourth 
Amendment barrier to the initial information-gathering activity in the 
field, the government will be in a position to perform comprehensive 
secret surveillance of the public without any structurally enforceable 
barrier, because it will no longer have to demand information in indi-
vidual cases from third parties or intrude upon the physical premises 
or possessions of a search target in order to gather information of in-
terest.  The acts of intruding upon a suspect’s demesnes or compelling 
cooperation from a third party are natural triggers for judicial process 
or public objection.  If the government has all necessary information 
for a search already in its possession, then we rely only upon its self-
restraint in choosing the scope and depth of otherwise unmonitorable 
searching.  This is precisely the self-restraint that the Fourth Amend-
ment eschews for intrusive government searches by requiring outside 
monitoring by disinterested magistrates — or individually exigent cir-
cumstances in which such monitoring can be bypassed. 
Professor Kerr develops the idea that “[a]ny observable retrieval of 
information stored on a computer hard drive, no matter how minor, 
should be considered a distinct Fourth Amendment search,”3 and then 
examines in detail how specifically warrants should be worded in 
framing such searches.  In light of the expansion of government sur-
veillance since the terrorist attacks of 2001, Professor Kerr’s suggestion 
appears both right and quaint: at exactly the time he offers a thorough 
framework of warrants and judicial review for searching hard drives, 
an increasing number of searches appear to be taking place entirely 
outside the well-traveled path of Fourth Amendment analysis, occur-
ring without the knowledge of the person searched and eschewing the 
use of prosecutors, judges, warrants, and particularity. 
A government owes its citizens physical protection, and there are 
times when searches are called for that do not abide by the usual 
Fourth Amendment protections.  The Fourth Amendment itself invites 
departures from any particular set of implementing protections, since it 
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simply proscribes “unreasonable” searches and seizures.  Hence 
searches undertaken to search for a ticking time bomb, rather than to 
find evidence of a past crime, may be reasonable even if undertaken 
without a warrant.  So, too, are standards lowered when housing in-
spectors look for safety violations or police officers frisk a suspect for 
weapons — instances in which special needs like immediate security 
trump privacy concerns.4  Taken together, however, the current areas 
of expansion of surveillance appear permanent rather than exigent, 
and sweeping rather than focused, causing the justifications behind 
special needs exceptions to swamp the baseline protections established 
for criminal investigations.  This expansion stands to remove the struc-
tural safeguards designed to forestall the abuse of power by a govern-
ment that knows our secrets. 
I.  SHIFTS FROM PERSONAL TO NETWORKED STORAGE 
The rise of always-on broadband has led to a shift toward the use 
of our personal computers as mere workstations, with private data 
stored remotely in the hands of third parties.  There is little reason to 
think that people have — or ought to have — any less of a first-order 
reasonable expectation of privacy for e-mail stored on their behalf by 
Google and Microsoft than they would have if it were stored “locally” 
in personal computers after being downloaded and deleted from their 
e-mail service providers.  The latest version of Google Desktop of-
fers a “Search Across Computers” feature that is advertised as al-
lowing users with multiple computers to find documents with 
one computer that are stored on another.5  It accomplishes this 
by sending a copy of the user’s documents to Google itself.  While 
functionally networking one’s own private computers would also not 
appear to change expectations of privacy in their contents, the place-
ment or storage of the data in others’ hands seems to render the 
Fourth Amendment’s doctrinal protections largely irrelevant.  In SEC 
v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc.,6 the Supreme Court held: 
It is established that, when a person communicates information to a third 
party even on the understanding that the communication is confidential, 
he cannot object if the third party conveys that information or records 
thereof to law enforcement authorities. . . . These rulings disable respon-
dents from arguing that notice of subpoenas issued to third parties is nec-
essary to allow a target to prevent an unconstitutional search or seizure of 
his papers.7 
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A transition of computing habits, from storing diaries, e-mail, and 
documents at home to generating business records held by a dot-com, 
can largely moot such debates as whether the interception of e-mail in 
transit (whether by government or private party) should be viewed as 
covered by the lesser statutory protections of the Stored Communica-
tions Act or the heightened ones of the Wiretap Act,8 since nearly all 
transient communication can now end up permanently and accessibly 
stored in the hands of third parties. 
These third parties typically say that they may elect to disclose 
any information upon the request of the government — at least after 
receiving assurances by the requesting party that the information is 
sought to enhance the public safety.9  Should a custodian deny a mere 
request for cooperation, the records might further be sought under the 
Stored Communications Act, which Professor Kerr has rightly de-
scribed as not entirely protective of privacy.10 
Or the holders of private records may be compelled to release them 
through any of a series of expanded information-gathering tools en-
acted by Congress in the wake of September 11.  For example, a third 
party storing networked, sensitive personal data could be sent a se-
cretly obtained, Federal Intelligence Security Act (FISA)-approved 
PATRIOT Act section 215 order, directing the production of “any tan-
gible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other 
items) for an investigation . . . to protect against international terror-
ism or clandestine intelligence activities.”11  The party upon whom the 
order is served can neither disclose nor appeal the order.12  The fact of 
the search therefore is not readily known by the target of interest in 
the search, since the party searched — whether a library, accountant, 
or Internet Service Provider (ISP) — is not itself the target of interest.  
Probable cause is not required for the search to be ordered, and indeed 
the target of interest may be assumed to be an innocent party, if the 
party is still generating records of interest to the government in an in-
ternational terrorism or counterintelligence investigation.  Roughly 
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1700 FISA applications were lodged in each of 2003 and 2004.13  (Four 
were rejected each year.) 
Any of these remote hosts might also be served a “national security 
letter” concerning the production of “envelope information.”  The let-
ters are written and executed without judicial oversight, and those 
who receive such letters are prohibited by law from telling anyone that 
they received them.14  National security letters may be used to solicit 
information held by particular kinds of private parties, including the 
records of telephone companies, financial institutions (now including 
such entities as pawn shops and travel agencies), and ISPs.15  For ISPs, 
the sorts of information that can be sought this way are “subscriber in-
formation and toll billing records information, or electronic communi-
cation transactional records.”16  This “envelope information” is not 
thought to extend to the contents of e-mail, but includes such things as 
the “to” and “from” fields of e-mail — or perhaps the contents of 
Google or other search engine queries made by a subscriber, since such 
queries are usually embedded in the URLs visited by that subscriber.  
If the government has questions about the identity of a user of a par-
ticular Internet Protocol address — the standard way to uniquely label 
each computer on the Internet — a national security letter could be 
used to match that address to a subscriber name.  Under section 505 of 
the PATRIOT Act, national security letters must meet a standard short 
of the probable cause standard associated with a traditional warrant: 
the FBI must instead assert to the private recipients of such letters 
that the records are sought in connection with an investigation into in-
ternational terrorism.17  Government officials are cited as indicating 
that more than 30,000 national security letters are issued per year.18  
Even if recipients of FISA orders or national security letters success-
fully press challenges to be permitted to disclose to the public that they 
have received such mandates,19 there is no assurance that they will do 
so — indeed, many may elect to remain silent about cooperating with 
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the government under these circumstances, keeping each of these 
searches secret from the target. 
While techniques for obtaining private communications and data 
that require less than probable cause are being explicitly deployed so 
far in the context of terrorism prevention, the movement of data from 
the PC to the network suggests that local law enforcement will follow: 
warrants served upon personal computers and their hard drives will 
yield less and less information since the data resides elsewhere, driving 
law enforcement to the networked third parties now hosting that in-
formation. 
Since the protections provided by these statutory schemes for the 
privacy of citizens’ digital communications are low compared to the 
default common law protections of warrants in criminal cases, it is 
particularly important for government searches of the sort described 
here to meet a basic Fourth Amendment test of reasonableness.  For 
remotely stored data, this suggests limiting the holding of SEC v. Jerry 
T. O’Brien, Inc. to the financial records held by a broker similar to 
those who figured in that case, rather than deducing that all cases of 
third-party custody of personal information entail no Fourth Amend-
ment protections for the person whose information is so held.  This is a 
reasonable limit to draw if the borders of one’s home no longer corre-
late well to the borders of one’s digital private life.  The ability to store 
nearly all one’s data remotely is an important and helpful technologi-
cal advance, all the more so because the data can still be made to ap-
pear to the user as if it were sitting on his or her own personal com-
puter.  But this suggests that the happenstance of where data is 
actually stored should not alone control the constitutional assessment 
of what standard the government must meet to intrude upon it.  
Consider Chapman v. United States,20 in which a police search of a 
rented house for a whiskey still was found to be a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment rights of the tenant whose illegally unregistered 
still was found — despite the fact that the landlord had consented to 
the search.21  The Court properly refused to find that the right against 
intrusion was held only by the absentee owner of the place intruded 
— rather, it was held by the person who actually lived and kept his ef-
fects there.  Similarly, the data we store for ourselves in servers that 
others own ought to be thought of as our own papers and effects in 
which we have a right to be secure.  Government intrusion into one’s 
personal data should face a Fourth Amendment test whatever its stor-
age configuration — PC or network. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  20  365 U.S. 610 (1961). 
  21  Id. at 610, 615–16. 2006]  SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN A NETWORKED WORLD  89 
Even information stored on a personal computer may no longer re-
quire the physical access to the hard drive that Professor Kerr so me-
ticulously documents and for which he seeks to establish boundaries.  
So long as the computer is networked, the government might obtain 
the suspect computer’s IP address using any of the less formal mecha-
nisms described above.  Then, it may insist that any provider of soft-
ware for that computer that supports “automatic update” deliver a 
special update to the computer prompting it to divulge any contents 
residing on the PC to the provider, which will in turn divulge them 
to the government. 
Professor Kerr’s exposure-based approach to searches seems par-
ticularly troublesome in this context.  “[I]n the computer context,” he 
writes, “there is no need to focus the ‘search’ inquiry on a physical ac-
tion like entry; the law can look directly to exposure.”22  By exposure, 
Professor Kerr means “when information from or about the data is ex-
posed to possible human observation, such as when it appears on a 
screen, rather than when it is copied by the hard drive or processed by 
the computer.”23  Such reasoning, however, would give constitutional 
imprimatur to the wholesale copying of users’ hard drives over the 
network using this technique, entailing no physical intrusion for which 
a warrant would be needed, and for which the copying itself would not 
be deemed a search until some indefinite later time when government 
officials chose to examine the data so copied.  Users’ private data — 
even that stored on their own PCs — could then, under this theory, be 
surreptitiously obtained and stored by the government, to be searched 
later should probable cause arise and a warrant be obtained or one of 
the newer terrorism-fighting tools be used — here by the government 
upon its own copy of hoarded citizen data.  Professor Kerr evinces 
some concern about this prospect and explores describing such copying 
as a seizure if not a search.24  Yet he rejects declaring outright that the 
very production of a “complete and invasive” machine copy by the gov-
ernment is a seizure, instead focusing on the “interference” caused by 
copying — interference that wanes as the ability to intrude remotely in-
creases.  He further appears to want to avoid the “seizure” label since it 
raises the question of how long the government can retain any copies it 
makes, analogous to having to return seized physical items to their 
original owners.25  But this is exactly a question that ought to figure 
into government-induced copying of our most private data: the reason-
ableness of such a search ought to hinge in part on retaining such data 
no longer than necessary for a specific purpose.  To explain that such a 
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question is difficult — for the odd reason that deleting files may not ac-
tually fully erase them from a particular hard drive26 — makes it no less 
pressing.  
The wholesale migration of private data from personal custody to 
that of faraway third parties should not entail a complete stripping of 
our Fourth Amendment interests in having that data secure from un-
reasonable government intrusion.  The shift from local to network 
storage also compels skepticism of the idea that mirroring of private 
data by the government is not itself a search.  We should avoid setting 
up a constitutional framework that would be silent should the govern-
ment choose to clone as much private data as it can extract from any 
source, left to its own self-restraint not to examine its own perma-
nently held copy of that data without obtaining a warrant. 
II.  MASS DATA MINING 
Professor Kerr’s view that a search does not take place until human 
eyes set upon its results may wrongly suggest that the newly revealed 
National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance program, which appears 
to rely on mass data mining, is comparatively innocuous from a Fourth 
Amendment perspective. 
In December 2005, the New York Times reported that the NSA has 
monitored telephone and Internet communications within the United 
States that originated or terminated outside the United States.27  Ac-
cording to government officials cited in the article, “[u]nder a presi-
dential order signed in 2002, the intelligence agency has monitored the 
international telephone calls and international e-mail messages of hun-
dreds, perhaps thousands, of people inside the United States without 
warrants over the past three years in an effort to track possible ‘dirty 
numbers’ linked to Al Qaeda.”28 
The Attorney General confirmed the existence of the classified pro-
gram in a press conference shortly thereafter.29  In follow-up reporting, 
the Times reported that the NSA has “reached agreements with major 
American telecommunications companies to gain access to some of the 
country’s biggest ‘switches’ carrying phone and e-mail traffic into and 
out of the country” for large-scale data mining.30  The program was 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  26  Id. 
  27  See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
  28  Id. 
  29  Press Briefing, Alberto Gonzales, Attorney Gen. & General Michael Hayden, Principal 
Deputy Dir. for Nat’l Intelligence (Dec. 19,  2005),  available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html.  
  30  Eric Lichtblau, Bush Defends Spy Program and Denies Misleading Public, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 2, 2006, at A11.  2006]  SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN A NETWORKED WORLD  91 
not specifically authorized by Congress — and indeed, the Attorney 
General conceded that it appears on its face to violate FISA.31  He be-
lieves it is permissible nonetheless, as authorized either by the more 
general Authorization for the Use of Military Force legislated in the 
wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, or through the inherent 
(and perhaps congressionally unmodifiable) power of the President to 
protect national security and to wage war.32 
The parameters of the NSA surveillance program are not well un-
derstood — public knowledge is thus far built around leaks to the New 
York Times and limited statements by public officials in reaction to the 
leaks — but it appears to involve data mining at key points of inter-
connection for the global Internet, with the acquiescence of the net-
work operators.33  If the NSA has indeed spliced in to Internet and te-
lephony backbones in order to perform such scanning, there would be 
few technical barriers to it saving all such data as it measures it, for 
later searching.  As such databases grow, the government then essen-
tially possesses its own stockpile of the nation’s communications on 
which to perform searches.  For the direct purposes of the NSA pro-
gram, the executive might elect to search the database for communica-
tions that appear to begin or terminate overseas and that, through the 
search terms used, appear to involve only terrorism.  However, it — or 
local governments, for that matter — might then obtain traditional 
warrants by which to search the database more broadly.  If the origi-
nal compilation of the database is of no Fourth Amendment moment, 
then the use of warrants, based upon probable cause, to search for in-
formation having to do with regular crimes might also be deemed 
permissible.  Such searches would naturally be secret since no further 
intrusion upon the target or a third party (such as an ISP) is needed to 
execute them. 
This highlights the most worrisome aspects of current government 
surveillance of digital space: it is undertaken entirely in secret, both as 
a general matter and for any specific search, and it exists in the ab-
sence of any statutory framework or judicial oversight.  Professor 
Stuntz explains the value of a renewed focus on analogous physical 
“data mining” via group sweeps — for example, the searching of all 
cars near the site of a terrorist threat — and points out that such 
searches are naturally (and healthily) limited by the fact that large 
swaths of the public are noticeably burdened by them and can there-
fore object to them through the judicial or political processes should 
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they become too onerous.34  No such check is present in the digital en-
vironment; boundless searching can be done with no noticeable burden 
— indeed, without notice of any kind — on the parties searched.   
Those who believe that no search takes place until human eyes rest 
upon results may not worry about data mining — they may even find 
such searches to comprise a perfect balance of benefit for law enforce-
ment and protection of privacy.  This view relies on two misconcep-
tions. 
First, as Professor Kerr points out, there is no such thing as a “Per-
fect Tool” that will ferret out only evidence of, say, a terrorist plot.35  
The existence of a trove of data — for Professor Kerr’s purposes, an 
entire hard drive; for ours, an entire network’s worth of interchanges 
— therefore inevitably calls upon human eyes to see both innocent and 
not-so-innocent contents.  Professor Kerr’s solution to this problem is 
not to limit the kinds of searches that can be performed — so-called 
“ex ante” restrictions imposed through warrants that clearly specify 
what kinds of searches can be performed — but instead to consider, 
though not yet fully advocate, eliminating the plain view doctrine for 
digital searches.  This would prevent more broadly conducted searches 
from becoming fishing expeditions for evidence of any crime once 
probable cause to search for a given crime had been obtained.  This 
solution does not prevent the revelation of wholly innocent private ma-
terial found in searches — it merely alters what the government can 
successfully prosecute should incriminating evidence be found.  In the 
context of broad-based secret searches, Professor Stuntz also turns to 
limits on prosecution to avoid abuse, believing that a line can be 
drawn between awful crimes that are serendipitously uncovered and 
less severe ones that would be off limits to prosecution,36 e ven as he 
acknowledges that the history of criminal procedure has been “trans-
substantive,” with constitutional limits on searches applying “equally 
to suspected drug dealers and suspected terrorists.”37  He also proposes 
limits on public disclosure of any other data retrieved through secret 
searches.38  These solutions are only effective to the extent that one be-
lieves that the principal damage from unfettered government access to 
private data arises from unjustified (if evidence-supported) criminal 
prosecutions or from embarrassing public disclosures of search results.  
These are evils, to be sure, but they are not the only ones.  The realiza-
tion that every digital movement is recorded and monitored itself will 
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chill private behavior, and public concern about abuse can further af-
fect behavior even if that concern is unwarranted because the public 
actors are good or because they are limited by law. 
This reveals a second misconception: that a democratic system 
cannot thrive in the long term in the absence of independent oversight 
of government surveillance activity.  Judge Posner believes that any 
abuse of secret, warrantless surveillance will be readily outed by gov-
ernment leaks and punished by the political process — presumably ei-
ther at the ballot box or through removal, impeachment, or even 
prosecution of implicated officials.39  His reasoning would appear to 
apply equally to wholly domestic surveillance as it does to surveillance 
in which one party is thought to be outside the United States.  This is 
too thin a basis on which to find the combination of new search tactics 
consonant with the Fourth Amendment.  The Fourth Amendment 
hazards an answer to the question, “Who will watch the watchers?”  
Judge Posner’s answer — whistleblowers who leak to the press — is 
especially inapt when a small number of people in power could per-
form nearly unlimited searching without the assistance of many others, 
circumscribing the number of potential whistleblowers even as the 
amount of information they can unearth is unprecedented. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The power of the Fourth Amendment interpretation intended by 
Professor Kerr for personal hard drives in the “standard” criminal con-
text is that it involves disinterested parties from an entirely separate 
branch of government providing at least a cursory review of the facts 
and issuing warrants in the first place, whether broadly or narrowly 
drawn.  Each search has a beginning and an end, requiring another 
consultation with a magistrate if it is to be relaunched later.  The 
Fourth Amendment has been rightly construed flexibly to allow the 
government to conduct certain searches in exigent circumstances with-
out consultation with a judge, and even entirely in secret — limited 
exceptions to a general rule, the exceptions themselves designed and 
regulated by judges. 
A lack of oversight or adversarial process for the kinds of searches 
that are about to become common threatens to have the exceptions 
dwarf the rule.  National security letters, subject to no oversight except 
the conscience of the branch issuing them, push this limit, and exceed 
it when the recipients of such letters are said to be committing a 
criminal act when they consult lawyers about their options.  When the 
determination of whether a given search falls within certain secret pa-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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rameters is made by an intelligence agency shift supervisor rather than 
a federal judge, as part of a program that is both secret from the pub-
lic and most members of Congress, and is able to search massive 
amounts of private data traversing a network — the Fourth Amend-
ment has been stretched to the point of breakage.  “National security” 
and “terrorism” are ill-defined terms,40 and the pressures of fighting an 
unending war against unseen foes are too much for even the most 
dedicated shift supervisor or President to handle alone. 
The kind of incisive analysis used to parse the right balance to ap-
ply in permitting standard police searches of hard drives must be used 
to determine a new balance for searching our expanding digital world.  
We can find a way to use new investigative opportunities to thwart 
very real threats, while using processes that minimize the prospects for 
abuse.  We can understand remotely stored data as no less precious to 
the public merely because it has not been limited to a single personal 
hard drive, and require that special circumstances be shown before it 
can be seized by the government. 
Professor Viet Dinh, a former Department of Justice official, testi-
fied that “the current threat to America’s freedom comes from Al 
Qaeda and others who would do harm to America and her people, and 
not from the men and women of law enforcement who protect us from 
harm.”41  Concern for privacy is not, however, premised on impugning 
any particular law enforcement officer — indeed, officers ought to be 
presumed innocent of ill motive, just as a member of the public is enti-
tled to be, secure with his or her digital papers and effects, until there 
is reason to suspect otherwise.  The good work of law enforcement is 
honored by a process by which its work is observed and regulated, and 
by which its extraordinary tools of information gathering and its use 
of force are bounded.  The beauty of our system of checks and bal-
ances is that, if deployed properly, it need not ask us to trade off be-
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